

Mobile Silent and Continuous Authentication using Apps Sequence

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Abstract: The last years have seen a growing explosion of the use of mobile devices. As matter of fact “smart” devices are used for a plethora of activities: from spending leisure time on social networks to e-banking. For these reasons smart devices hold huge volumes of private and sensitive user data and allow the access to critical applications in terms of privacy and security. Currently mobile devices provide an authentication mechanism based on the login: they do not continuously verify the identity of the user while sensitive activities are performed. This mechanism may allow an adversary to access sensitive information about users and to replace them during sensitive tasks, once they have obtained the user’s credentials. To mitigate this risk, in this paper we propose a method for the silent and continuous authentication. Considering that each user typically runs recurrently a certain set of applications in every-day life, our method extracts this characterizing sequences of apps for profiling the user and recognizing the user of the device that is not the owner. Using machine learning techniques several classifiers have been trained and the effectiveness of the proposed method has been evaluated by modeling the user behavior of 15 volunteer participants. Encouraging results have been obtained, i.e. a precision in distinguishing an impostor from the owner equal to 99%. The main benefit of this method is that it does not use sensitive data, nor biometrics, which, if compromised, cannot be replaced.

1 INTRODUCTION

The most widespread method for authenticating users on mobile devices consists of inserting a password or a secret pattern. This mechanism is weak for many reasons: users often choose very simple and easily guessable passwords (Clarke and Furnell, 2005); patterns can be deduced with special lighting and high-resolution photography (Aviv et al., 2010). Finally recent studies (Harbach et al., 2014) revealed that about 34% users did not use any form of authentication on their devices, while 24% consider locking screens unnecessary. Consequently, unauthorized individuals may obtain access to the device, install malware or have access to a user’s personal information. To overcome this problem *continuous authentication*, also known as *active authentication* was proposed (Guidorizzi, 2013), which essentially makes use of *physiological* and *behavioral* biometrics using built-in sensors and accessories such as the gyroscope, touch screen, accelerometer, orientation sensor, and pressure sensor, to continuously monitor user identity.

Examples of physiological biometrics are the picture of the face or the fingerprint, while behavioral biometrics are gait, touch gestures and hand movement. Authors in literature have used interchangeably also the terms *implicit authentication* (Jakobsson et al., 2009), (Shi et al., 2010), and *transparent authentication* (Clarke, 2011). The methods for continuous authentication developed till now have different limitations: biometric data at enrollment time may have different characteristics than those presented during authentication. This problem is known as *domain adaptation* (Patel et al., 2015), and affect mainly face recognition. Many biometrics for continuous authentication raise issues of privacy disclosure (Šeděnka et al., 2015). Some of the physiological and behavioral biometrics based continuous authentication are vulnerable to spoofing, mimic, statistic, or digital replay attacks (Smith et al., 2015). Most continuous and authentication methods ignore usability and acceptability issues (Patel et al., 2016); finally, while a compromised password or a smart card can be revoked, a biometric is permanently associated with a

user, so that when compromised cannot be replaced. In order to overcome all these limitations, we propose a method for continuous authentication that identifies those sequences of apps that characterize the way each user uses the smartphones. The idea arises from the observation that the smartphone is becoming a tool that accompanies the everyday life, since we use smartphones for a lot of activities, and each person stabilizes certain recurrent habits in the use of the apps. Some apps are used in precise moments of the day or are not used in other moments. For example, Alex goes to run at 6 o'clock of Monday, Wednesday and Friday, and in that time, for one hour he launches "runtastic" and "spotify" apps. During office time Lisa doesn't use to see the email on the smartphone, but on the pc, thus she does never access Gmail app during work time. Standing these considerations, the authentication can be done on the basis of some characterizing sequences of apps that the user launches on the smartphone and that occur with a significant recursion. When an expected sequence of apps is not observed or when an unexpected sequence occurs, the system can rise an alarm or mark as "suspicious" the event on a log. The method is able to overcome the limitations of the traditional mechanisms of continuous authentication, as it does not affect the user's privacy nor requires biometrics and the experimentation demonstrated that it is able to produce an EER that is very competitive if compared with that of the other methods. The research question that we wish to answer is: "Can the sequence of apps launched by a smartphone's user distinguish the legitimate owner from an impostor?". The proposed mechanism should work as an anomaly detector, rather than in a positive recognition of the user, i.e. when the behavior of the user does not complain with the user profile, the system should signal an anomaly, with the purpose of logging "suspicious" activities or verifying the identity of the user with a stronger authentication mechanism.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related work, Section 3 presents the proposed approach, Section 4 evaluates the effectiveness of the approach and, finally, conclusion are drawn in Section 5.

2 RELATED WORK

Continuous authentication has been largely investigated and literature is plenty of a great variety of features that are collected for recognizing the user.

Gait's recognition consists of identifying a person by the walking way. Benabdelkader et al. (BenAb-

delkader et al., 2002) demonstrated that a person's height and stride allow to recognize correctly a person with 49% probability. Mantyjarvi et al. (Mantyjarvi et al., 2005) used three approaches of gait's recognition, namely correlation, frequency domain and data distribution statistics, producing respectively an EER of 7%, 10%, and 19%. Gafurov et al. (Gafurov et al., 2006) applied histogram similarity and cycle length, by achieving an EER of 5% and 9% respectively. Derawi et al. (Derawi et al., 2010) applied preprocessing, cycle detection and recognition analysis to the acceleration signal, obtaining an EER of 20%.

Touch gestures track the user's unique touch features, such as finger pressure and trajectory, the speed and acceleration of movement, and how the person interacts with the mobile device. Saevanee et al (Saevanee and Bhatarakosol, 2008) explored the use of three behavioral biometrics: the hold-time, the inter-key behavior, and the finger pressure. They found that the only usage of finger pressure produced an accuracy of 99%, similar to the results obtained with the combination of hold-time and finger pressure. Frank et al. (Frank et al., 2013) investigated 30 behavioral touch features, obtaining an EER of 0% for intra-session authentication, 2%-3% for inter-session authentication and below 4% when the authentication test was run one week after the enrollment phase. Li et al. (Li et al., 2013) proposed a system that learn the finger movements' patterns: the sliding up gesture produced an accuracy of 95.78%, the sliding down 95.30%, the sliding left 93.06%, the sliding right 92.56%, the up and tap 93.02%, the down and tap 89.25%, the left and tap 88.28% and the right and tap 89.66%. Sitov et al. (Zhao et al., 2013), proposed Hand Movement, Orientation, and Grasp (HMOG), a set of behavioral features which capture micro-movement and orientation dynamics for continuous authentication. They obtained an EER of 7.16% when the user's walking, and 10.05% when sitting. Buriro et al. (Buriro et al., 2016), introduced a system for profiling a user based on how he holds the phone by taking into account the micro-movements of a phone and the movements of the user's finger when interacting with the touchscreen. With Multilayer Perceptron 1-class verifier, they obtained 95% True Acceptance Rate (TAR) with 3.1% False Acceptance Rate (FAR) on a dataset of 30 volunteers.

Authors in (Canfora et al., 2016) propose a continuous and authentication method for Android smartphones that consider as discriminating features the device orientation, the touch and the cell tower. They obtain a precision in distinguishing an impostor from the owner between 99% and 100%.

Multimodal is the combination of different bio-

metric features. Kim et al (Kim et al., 2010) proposed a fusion of face, teeth and voice modalities. The validation produced an EER of 1.64%. Bo et al. (Bo et al., 2013) proposed a system for continuous authentication that exploits dynamics mined from the user walking patterns in combination with the touch behavior bio-metrics and the micro-movement of the mobile device caused by users screen-touch actions. They showed that the user identification accuracy was over 99%. Zheng et al. (Zheng et al., 2014), proposed a mechanism using the fusion of four features (acceleration, pressure, size, and time) extracted from smart phone sensors (accelerometer, gyroscope, and touch screen sensors). Experimentation showed an EER of 3.65%

Some authors investigated the way user performs the *input*, like Seo et al. (Seo et al., 2012) and Shen et al. (De Luca et al., 2012), obtaining an accuracy of respectively 100%, 77%, and the third one a false rejection rate of 6.85%, and a false-acceptance rate of 5.01%

Power consumption was also investigated as identifier of a user as in Murmura et al. (Murmura et al., 2012), which used power consumption along with touch gestures and physical movements, obtaining an EER varying between 6.1% and 6.9%. Li et al. (Shye et al., 2009) explored the usage of application (application time, name and time of application usage), obtaining an EER of 13.5%. A behavior profiling method based on application usage, Bluetooth sightings and Wi-Fi access point sightings was presented in (Neal et al., 2015): authors reported average identification rates of 80%, 77%, 93%, and 85%.

Different solutions were also proposed for *face recognition* (Hadid et al., 2007) (producing and average authentication rate between 82% and 96%), (Fathy et al., 2015) (showing a recognition rate of 95%), (Crouse et al., 2015) (with an EER between 13% and 30%), and (Abeni et al., 2006) (EER between 3.95% and 7.92%).

Differently from these methods, the method proposed in this paper collects only recurring sequence of apps that can identify the owner behavior, thus does not collect sensitive data nor user biometrics, and produce a very low EER, competitive with the best results recorded in literature.

3 THE METHOD

The proposed approach consists of extracting a set of features, captured directly on the device during its usage, which are intended to characterize the user behaviour.

The features' set considered is a sequence of applications that show some recurrent usage patterns, i.e. are launched (or never launched) in precise moments of the day or in a certain order. In order to gather these information, an application has been developed that must be installed on the smartphone or the tablet where the user must be authenticated.

The proposed method takes into account the application sequences related to: (i) Activities: an activity is one of the fundamental building blocks of an Android app. It is the entry point for a user's interaction with an app, and it plays also a central role in the user navigation of an app (with the *Back button*) or between apps (with the *Recents* button); (ii) Services: a service allows an application component to perform long-running operations in background, without providing a user interface. Another application component can start a service, while it continues to run in background even if the user switches to another application. Since there are many versions of the Android operating system released by Google, causing consequent changes of the API, different methods have been used to retrieve the sequence of applications (i.e., Activities and Services) launched by the user.

With regards to the Activities gathering, for the operating system versions before Android M, the `getRunningAppProcesses()` method belonging to the `ActivityManager` class¹ was used: this method is able to return a list of application processes that are running on the device. In order to solve the compatibility problems with the operating system versions after Android M, the "Android toolbox"² utility was leveraged, that is a multi-function program: it encapsulates the functionality of many common Linux commands (and some special Android ones) into a single binary. This makes it more compact than having all those other commands installed individually. However, the toolbox versions of these commands (e.g. 'ps', or 'ls') have less functionality than their full-sized Linux counterparts. The actual toolbox binary is often located in `/system/bin` directory on an Android system, and the commands that it supports are listed as symlinks within `/system/bin/toolbox`. The `ps` command provided by the tool was used for displaying information about the active processes.

For the several Android operating system versions, the recognition of the duration of a foreground activities was possible by detecting, for each device, a list of launchers so as to precisely determine the instant when the user changes the context. In

¹<https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/ActivityManager.html>

²http://elinux.org/Android_toolbox

order to gather invoked Services, for Android versions with operating system versions equal to 4.4 or less, the `getServices()` method belonging to the `ActivityManager` class was used to extrapolate the services in execution.

By using the ad-hoc developed app, it is possible to retrieve the raw user traces, containing the list of the first 1000 invoked Activities and Services. Starting from the raw traces, the relevant transitions between activities and services for each user are built, as the tree in Figure 1 outlines.




Figure 1: The valid applications set and the system one.

Fig.1 shows that the observed user invokes first the *a1* application, then the *a2*, thus the user comes back to the *a1* application. The user invokes the *aS1* application and start, respectively, the *a1*, the *aS2* and the *a2* applications.

The tree is built from the Activities and the Services invoked by the user in a time-window of 1 day.

From the traces, we obtained two sets of applications: the first set is represented by the valid applications (i.e., the applications effectively invoked by the user), while the second one includes the system applications set which are discarded because does not provide helpful information for our aims, as Fig.2 shows.




Figure 2: The valid applications set and the system applications set.

In the tree shown in Figure 1, *a1* and *a2* represent the valid applications, while *aS1* and *aS2* the system applications: the last ones are excluded by the analysis. System applications are not included in the features set because they add only noise in the data, as

these applications are launched by many different applications and are scarcely explicative of the user's behavior.

The system applications which are discarded are: (i) *com.google.android.gms.persistent*: it is part of Google Play Services, and it enables the user to benefit of Google-powered features, such as Maps, Google+, with automatic platform updates distributed through the Google Play store³; (ii) *system:ui*: it represents the process responsible for the system bars, i.e. screen areas dedicated to the display of notifications, communications of the device status, and the device navigation. Typically the system bars are displayed concurrently with the running application; (iii) *android:ui*: it is the process responsible to manage the user interface and a variety of pre-built UI components such as structured layout objects and UI controls as dialogs, notifications, and menus provided by Android. When the user receives a notification from an application that is not running in foreground, the related Service is gathered also if the user does not run the application. Considering that the messaging applications like WhatsApp⁴ and Telegram⁵ typically send a great number of notifications and such notifications create noise, notifications received by this kind of applications have been excluded.

In order to correctly identify the application of the *Communication* category⁶ (in order to exclude from the analysis the notification Service, but not the Activity invoked by the user for running the application), an open-source API for the Google Play market⁷ has been used. This API allows to mine the official market servers for retrieving apps and the related metadata: specifically, the API was used for identifying the category of the application that sends the notification, excluding the application belonging to the *Communication* category.

In order to gather the application Service responsible for sending the notification, the developed application needs to change the correspondent setting. At the first start the application, by using the `android.settings.ACTION_NOTIFICATION_LISTENER_SETTINGS` implicit intent the user is redirected to the operating system settings, which allows to activate the correspondent flag (this procedure is necessary only with

³<https://play.google.com/store?hl=it>

⁴<https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.whatsapp&hl=it>

⁵<https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=org.telegram.messenger&hl=it>

⁶<https://play.google.com/store/apps/category/COMMUNICATION>

⁷<https://github.com/jberkel/android-market-api>

operating system version equal to 5.0 and higher).

The developed application does not require root privileges, but it requires the following permissions: (i) android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE: this permission enables the application to write to external storage; this permission needs to store on the external device memory the raw traces of the user; (ii) android.permission.READ_CONTACTS: this permission allows the application to read the user's contacts data: this permission lets to identify the user; (iii) android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED: this permission enables the application to know when the device is booted: this permission lets the developed application to be run at device boot time. The developed application sends the raw traces to a NoSQL database. The database is managed with the Google App Engine⁸, a platform for building scalable web applications and mobile backends.

4 THE EVALUATION

An experiment has been designed and carried out for evaluating the effectiveness of the proposed technique.

More specifically, the experiment is aimed at verifying whether the features representing the sequence of the applications invoked by the user are able to discriminate the device owner by an impostor.

The classification of owner and impostor is done with several state of the art machine learning classifiers built with the features.

The evaluation consists of three stages: (i) a comparison of descriptive statistics of the populations of application sequences; (ii) hypotheses testing, to verify whether the features have different distributions for the populations of impostors and owner; and (iii) a classification analysis aimed at assessing whether the features are able to correctly classify the device user as impostor or owner.

We provide the descriptive statistics with the box plots of the distributions of impostors and owners, in order to demonstrate that they belong to different populations.

With regards to the hypotheses testing, the null hypothesis to be tested is:

H_0 : 'impostor and owner have similar values of the considered features'.

The null hypothesis was tested with Mann-Whitney (with the p-level fixed to 0.05) and with Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test (with the p-level fixed to

0.05). Two different tests are run with the aim of enforcing the conclusion validity.

The purpose of these tests is to determine the level of significance, i.e., the risk (the probability) that erroneous conclusions be drawn: in our case, the significance level is set to .05, which means that it is accepted to make mistakes 5 times out of 100.

The classification analysis was aimed at assessing whether the features were able to correctly classify impostors and owner. Six algorithms of classification were used: J48, LADTree, RandomForest, RandomTree, RepTree and SimpleCart. These algorithms were applied to the feature vector.

The classification analysis was accomplished with Weka⁹, a suite of machine learning software, largely employed in data mining for scientific research.

More specifically, the experiment is aimed at verifying whether the features are able to classify a behavior trace as performed by the owner or by an impostor.

For the sake of clarity, the results of the evaluation will be discussed reflecting the data analysis' organization in the three phases: descriptive statistics, hypotheses testing and classification.

We observed 15 users for 21 days: the evaluation time window began on *March 13, 2016* and finished on *April 4, 2016*. We collected the first 1000 applications for device each usage session ran by each user under analysis during a 1-day temporal window, and we consider the sequence of these 1000 applications as the feature vector. Each application invoked represents a feature: we indicate with FX the X feature, where $1 \leq X \leq 1000$ (i.e., X represents the X-th application invoked by the user under analysis).

Table 1 provides the details of the observed devices used to evaluate the proposed method: in the experiment both smartphones and tablets are used as experimental environments.

Figure 3 shows the number of observations collected for each user involved in the experiment, i.e. the number of traces (i.e., the user usage sessions) gathered from each single device.




Figure 3: Number of observations for each users involved in the study

⁸<https://cloud.google.com/appengine/>

⁹<http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/>

User	Sex	Age	Vendor	Model	O.S. version	Smartphone	Tablet
#1	F	20	Samsung	S4 mini	4.4.2	X	
#2	M	24	LG	Nexus 5	6.0.1	X	
#3	M	54	Samsung	Galaxy J1	4.4.2	X	
#4	F	24	LG	Nexus 5	6.0.1	X	
#5	M	16	Asus	Zenfone 2	5.0	X	
#6	F	30	Samsung	Galaxy grand prime	5.1.0	X	
#7	M	26	Asus	Zenfone 2	5.1.0	X	
#8	M	28	Samsung	S6	6.0.1	X	
#9	M	24	LG	Nexus 5	6.0.1	X	
#10	F	24	Asus	Zenfone 2	5.1.0	X	
#11	F	50	Asus	Zenpad 7	4.4.2		X
#12	F	50	Asus	Zenfone 5	4.4.2	X	
#13	F	14	Samsung	Tab 2	4.4.2		X
#14	M	55	Samsung	Galaxy note 3	4.4.2	X	
#15	M	27	Samsung	S3	4.3	X	

Table 1: Devices involved in the evaluation with owner characterization.

The user with the longest trace number in the dataset is the user #8, but all the users involved in the experiment presents a number of observations ranging between 20 and 40: this is symptomatic of the fact that the users effectively use the device in the every-day life during the time-window of the experiment.

4.1 Descriptive statistics

The analysis of box plots related to the feature vector helps to identify whether the features are helpful to discriminate the behavior of users or not. For reasons of space the boxplots related to the F1 (in Figure 4), F2 (in Figure 5), F3 (in Figure 6) and F4 (in Figure 7) features are reported.

The boxplots related to F1 feature are shown in Fig 4. It arises that Users #2, #4 and #8 exhibit a similar distribution, while Users #1, #3, #5, #6, #7, #9, #10, #11, #12, #13, #14 and #15 present a different distribution. This suggests that most of users involved in the experiment usually run different applications (i.e., 12 Users on 15).

The boxplots related to the F2 feature, are shown in Fig 5, and indicate that Users #2, #3, #7, #11, #12, #14 and #15 present a similar distribution of the features, while the distribution of Users #1, #4, #5, #6, #8, #9, #10 behaviors is less varying if compared with the previous users. As a matter of fact, users exhibit an evident diversity among each others, which is represented by the different level of medians for each user and by the variability of the box plots' width.

The boxplots related to the F3 feature, are shown in Fig 6. Users #2, #4, #7, #11, #12, #14 and #15 exhibit a similar distribution that is different from the one exhibited by the remaining users. As matter of

fact, Users #1, #3, #5, #6 have a tiny distribution, Users #9 and #10 the thinnest, while User #8 the widest one.

The boxplots related to the F4 feature, is shown in Fig 7. Users #2, #4, #7, #11, #12, #14 and #15 exhibit a similar distributions that is different from the one exhibit by the remaining users. As matter of fact, Users #1, #3, #5, #6 exhibit a tiny distribution, Users #9 and #10 the thinnest, while User #8 the widest one.

Very thin distributions are exhibited by users #1, #3, #6, #9, # 10 and #13, while the widest one corresponds to the Users #8 (as in the previous boxplot in Fig. 6 representing the distribution of the F3 feature). The remaining Users i.e. #2, #4, #5, #7, #11, #12, #14 and #15 are pretty similar.

From the boxplot analysis it is possible to conclude that from a statical point of view the extracted features can be a good candidate to discriminate between users; as a matter of fact, in each box plot different groups of users exhibit different distributions. This result is indicative that a single application is not able to distinguish the individual user, but a sequence of applications may be able to uniquely identify the owner, and then to discriminate the impostors from the owner. The classification analysis will complete the picture, by indicating that the combination of all the measures can successfully help to identify correctly the impostors.

4.2 Hypothesis testing

The hypothesis testing aims at evaluating if the features produce different distributions for the populations of users with statistical evidence.

The results are assumed valid when the null hy-




Figure 4: Boxplots related to the distribution of F1 feature.




Figure 5: Boxplots related to the distribution of F2 feature.

pothesis is rejected by both the tests performed.

Table 2 shows the results of hypothesis testing: the null hypothesis H_0 can be rejected for all the features i.e., there is statistical evidence that the feature vector is a potential candidate for correctly classifying a device's owner.

Variable	Mann-Whitney	Kolmogorov-Smirnov
F1	0,000000	$p < .001$
F2	0,000000	$p < .001$
F3	0,000000	$p < .001$
F4	0,000000	$p < .001$

Table 2: Results of the test of the null hypothesis H_0

For reasons of spaces, Table 2 shows the result of the Hypothesis testing for the first four features evaluated, but also the remaining features passed the Mann-Whitney and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests successfully.

This result will provide an evaluation of the risk to generalize the fact that the selected features produce values which belong to two different distributions (i.e., the one related to the impostors and the owner).

4.3 Classification analysis

Seven metrics were used to evaluate the classification results: Precision, Recall, F-Measure, ROC Area, FRR, FAR and ERR.

The precision has been computed as the proportion of the examples that truly belong to class X

among all those which were assigned to the class. It is the ratio of the number of relevant records retrieved to the total number of irrelevant and relevant records retrieved:

$$Precision = \frac{tp}{tp+fp}$$

where tp indicates the number of true positives and fp indicates the number of false positives.

The recall has been computed as the proportion of examples that were assigned to class X, among all the examples that truly belong to the class, i.e., how much part of the class was captured. It is the ratio of the number of relevant records retrieved to the total number of relevant records:

$$Recall = \frac{tp}{tp+fn}$$

where tp indicates the number of true positives and fn indicates the number of false negatives.

The F-Measure is a measure of a test's accuracy. This score can be interpreted as a weighted average of the precision and recall:

$$F-Measure = 2 * \frac{Precision * Recall}{Precision + Recall}$$

The Roc Area is defined as the probability that a positive instance randomly chosen is classified above a negative randomly chosen.

The last three metrics considered are used in biometrics in order to verify the instance of a security




Figure 6: Boxplots related to the distribution of F3 feature.




Figure 7: Boxplots related to the distribution of F4 feature.

system that incorrectly identifies an unauthorized person: FAR, FRR and EER.

The FAR (i.e., false acceptance rate) is the measure of the likelihood that the biometric security system will incorrectly accept an access attempt by an unauthorized user. A system's FAR typically is stated as the ratio of the number of false acceptances (fa) divided by the number of impostor attempts (ia):

$$\text{False Acceptance Rate} = \frac{fa}{ia}$$

The FAR spans in the interval [0,1]: closer to 0 the FAR is the better is the capability to recognize correctly the impostor.

The FRR (i.e., false recognition rate) is the measure of the likelihood that the biometric security system will incorrectly reject an access attempt by an authorized user. A system's FRR typically is stated as the ratio of the number of false rejections (fr) divided by the number of owner attempts (oa).

The FRR is defined as:

$$\text{False Rejection Rate} = \frac{fr}{oa}$$

The best FRR has the value of 0, while the worst FRR has the values of 1.

The EER (i.e. equal error rate) of a system can be used to give a threshold independent performance measure: it represents a biometric security system algorithm used to predetermines the threshold values for its false acceptance rate and its false rejection

rate. When the rates are equal, the common value is referred to as the equal error rate. The value indicates that the proportion of false acceptances is equal to the proportion of false rejections. The lower the EER is, the better is the system's performance, as the total error rate which is the sum of the FAR and the FRR at the point of the EER decreases. The EER is defined as:

$$\text{Equal Error Rate} = \frac{FAR + FRR}{2}$$

The classification analysis consisted of building classifiers in order to evaluate the features vector accuracy to distinguish between impostors and owner.

For training the classifier, T is a set of labelled behavior traces (BT, l), where each BT is associated to a label $l \in \{impostor, owner\}$. For each BT a feature vector $F \in R_y$ is built, where y is the number of the features used in training phase ($y=1000$).

For the learning phase, a k-fold cross-validation was used: the dataset is randomly partitioned into k subsets. A single subset is retained as the validation dataset for testing the model, while the remaining k-1 subsets of the original dataset are used as training data. The process is repeated for k=10 times; each one of the k subsets has been used once as the validation dataset. To obtain a single estimate, the average of the k results is computed from the folds.

The effectiveness of the classification method is evaluated with the following procedure:

1. build a training set $T \subset D$;

2. build a testing set $T' = D \div T$;
3. run the training phase on T ;
4. apply the learned classifier to each element of T' .

A 10-fold cross validation was performed: the four steps are repeated 10 times, varying the composition of T (and hence of T'), classifying the full set of features.

Each classification was performed using 20% of the dataset as training dataset and 80% as testing dataset.

$C_{u,s}$ is the set of the classifications performed, where u identifies the user ($1 \leq u \leq 15$).

For sake of clarity an example will explain the method adopted: C_2 classification means that the traces related to the user #2 are labeled as owner traces, while the traces of the other user as impostor.

The results obtained with this procedure are shown in Table 3 and Table 4.

The classification results suggest that frequently recurrent sequences of apps can be good features to recognize the legitimate device owner from an impostor, as for most experimental subjects, the precision and the recall range between 92% and 99%. The gap between the two interval's edges is about 7 percentage points, which is pretty wide. This could indicate that some users have certain sequences of apps that are more recurrent than other users.

What is worth attention is the obtained EER, which ranges from 0.045 to 0.476: this result is the main relevant finding of the experimentation, since it is very low, especially if compared with the EER produced by other methods of continuous authentication, discussed in the section of Related Work.

In order to measure the performance of the proposed method, the average times employed for the classification task was measured, for each classification algorithm run obtaining: 0.82 s with J48, 6.74 s with LADTree, 0.3 s with RandomForest, 0.5 s with RandomTree, 0.25 s with REPTree and 1.49 s with SimpleCart algorithm. The machine used was an Intel Core i5 desktop with 4 gigabyte RAM, equipped with Linux Mint 15.

In the light of the obtained results, it is possible to conclude that recurrent sequences of apps could be a good candidate indicator for recognizing the legitimate owner of the device. This method does not impact the privacy of the owner, as it does not elaborate users' data, nor biometrics (which if compromised cannot be replaced). Moreover the method demonstrated to be not particularly costly in terms of computational resources. The only limitation of the experiment stands in the number of experimental subjects, which is not very high, even if the time window for

collecting the observations is quite wide. For this reason, the validation should be considered as a preliminary exploration of the effectiveness of the method and deserves further replications in huger contexts.

5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS

The current authentication mechanisms provided by the mobile operating systems are not able to ensure that an adversary may have access to another user's smartphone. As matter of fact, once the user has unlocked the device by entering the PIN code, the operating system does not perform any checks on the user of the device. In order to overcome this limitation this paper proposes a method able to silently and continuously authenticate the user. A features vector consisting in the sequence of the recurring apps is used for profiling the user; with machine learning techniques such a vector is applied for distinguishing the impostors from the legitimate user. Results are significantly better than those reported in current literature: a precision and a recall equal to 0.99 collecting data from 15 volunteer participants in a 21-day time window have been obtained. As future work, we plan to correlate the apps sequence with the activation of resources as Wi-fi, bluetooth and gps in order to enforce the continuous and silent authentication mechanism.

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Category	Algorithm	Precision	Recall	F-Measure	Roc Area	FRR	FAR	ERR
User #1	J48	0.968	0.964	0.966	0.778	0.036	0.246	0.141
	LADTree	0.976	0.975	0.975	0.858	0.028	0.218	0.123
	RandomForest	0.994	0.994	0.994	0.995	0.004	0.082	0.045
	RandomTree	0.982	0.979	0.98	0.935	0.021	0.110	0.065
	REPTree	0.967	0.967	0.967	0.881	0.033	0.327	0.18
	SimpleCart	0.976	0.976	0.976	0.84	0.024	0.272	0.148
User #2	J48	0.902	0.906	0.903	0.809	0.094	0.329	0.211
	LADTree	0.901	0.907	0.902	0.853	0.094	0.36	0.231
	RandomForest	0.923	0.926	0.921	0.926	0.071	0.348	0.209
	RandomTree	0.896	0.899	0.897	0.796	0.101	0.330	0.215
	REPTree	0.886	0.896	0.885	0.809	0.104	0.471	0.28
	SimpleCart	0.9	0.907	0.901	0.786	0.093	0.391	0.242
User #3	J48	0.964	0.963	0.963	0.83	0.068	0.643	0.355
	LADTree	0.937	0.942	0.939	0.837	0.058	0.674	0.366
	RandomForest	0.967	0.965	0.956	0.94	0.051	0.898	0.474
	RandomTree	0.951	0.95	0.951	0.736	0.074	0.699	0.385
	REPTree	0.933	0.945	0.938	0.758	0.055	0.898	0.476
	SimpleCart	0.908	0.953	0.93	0.463	0.047	0.953	0.5
User #4	J48	0.931	0.932	0.932	0.652	0.068	0.643	0.355
	LADTree	0.924	0.938	0.93	0.902	0.062	0.77	0.416
	RandomForest	0.934	0.95	0.934	0.889	0.051	0.898	0.474
	RandomTree	0.927	0.926	0.927	0.629	0.074	0.669	0.371
	REPTree	0.917	0.945	0.926	0.613	0.055	0.898	0.476
	SimpleCart	0.927	0.949	0.926	0.545	0.051	0.923	0.487
User #5	J48	0.928	0.933	0.931	0.567	0.067	0.694	0.380
	LADTree	0.921	0.936	0.928	0.636	0.062	0.796	0.429
	RandomForest	0.9	0.947	0.923	0.89	0.051	0.949	0.5
	RandomTree	0.93	0.928	0.929	0.642	0.072	0.643	0.357
	REPTree	0.953	0.95	0.927	0.632	0.5	0.923	0.486
	SimpleCart	0.9	0.949	0.924	0.47	0.051	0.949	0.5
User #6	J48	0.928	0.933	0.93	0.76	0.067	0.436	0.251
	LADTree	0.938	0.943	0.938	0.946	0.057	0.449	0.253
	RandomForest	0.928	0.935	0.924	0.941	0.061	0.547	0.304
	RandomTree	0.929	0.924	0.926	0.797	0.076	0.326	0.201
	REPTree	0.925	0.929	0.927	0.832	0.071	0.423	0.247
	SimpleCart	0.929	0.933	0.93	0.829	0.067	0.422	0.244
User #7	J48	0.897	0.92	0.905	0.565	0.69	0.771	0.425
	LADTree	0.882	0.904	0.892	0.605	0.096	0.807	0.451
	RandomForest	0.934	0.939	0.921	0.856	0.062	0.735	0.398
	RandomTree	0.897	0.9	0.898	0.61	0.1	0.668	0.384
	REPTree	0.879	0.921	0.893	0.586	0.079	0.892	0.485
	SimpleCart	0.858	0.926	0.891	0.479	0.074	0.926	0.5

Table 3: Classification results for Users #1, #2, #3, #4, #5, #6 and #7: Precision, Recall, F-Measure, RocArea, FRR, FAR and ERR for classifying the feature set, computed with six different classification algorithms. The Time column represents the time in seconds taken to build the model.

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Category	Algorithm	Precision	Recall	F-Measure	Roc Area	FRR	FAR	ERR
<i>User #8</i>	J48	0.924	0.933	0.927	0.622	0.067	0.59	0.328
	LADTree	0.948	0.953	0.948	0.867	0.01	0.411	0.21
	RandomForest	0.972	0.971	0.967	0.941	0.032	0.41	0.221
	RandomTree	0.949	0.95	0.95	0.802	0.05	0.341	0.195
	REPTree	0.932	0.942	0.933	0.679	0.058	0.608	0.333
	SimpleCart	0.935	0.943	0.932	0.643	0.057	0.643	0.35
<i>User #9</i>	J48	0.943	0.945	0.944	0.681	0.055	0.511	0.283
	LADTree	0.947	0.95	0.948	0.801	0.05	0.511	0.280
	RandomForest	0.95	0.956	0.944	0.845	0.049	0.849	0.449
	RandomTree	0.911	0.908	0.91	0.561	0.092	0.779	0.435
	REPTree	0.946	0.954	0.943	0.727	0.046	0.728	0.387
	SimpleCart	0.958	0.961	0.953	0.737	0.039	0.631	0.335
<i>User #10</i>	J48	0.968	0.968	0.968	0.876	0.032	0.292	0.162
	LADTree	0.955	0.958	0.956	0.879	0.035	0.413	0.224
	RandomForest	0.965	0.967	0.961	0.914	0.029	0.485	0.257
	RandomTree	0.948	0.953	0.95	0.704	0.047	0.535	0.291
	REPTree	0.965	0.965	0.965	0.874	0.035	0.316	0.175
	SimpleCart	0.957	0.961	0.958	0.856	0.039	0.486	0.262
<i>User #11</i>	J48	0.976	0.972	0.974	0.939	0.028	0.164	0.096
	LADTree	0.968	0.968	0.968	0.911	0.032	0.327	0.179
	RandomForest	0.968	0.971	0.968	0.967	0.026	0.354	0.19
	RandomTree	0.964	0.964	0.964	0.805	0.036	0.354	0.195
	REPTree	0.975	0.972	0.973	0.923	0.028	0.191	0.109
	SimpleCart	0.968	0.968	0.968	0.955	0.032	0.327	0.179
<i>User #12</i>	J48	0.934	0.936	0.935	0.878	0.064	0.281	0.172
	LADTree	0.937	0.94	0.936	0.941	0.06	0.354	0.207
	RandomForest	0.95	0.951	0.948	0.941	0.05	0.31	0.405
	RandomTree	0.921	0.921	0.921	0.807	0.079	0.304	0.191
	REPTree	0.925	0.931	0.926	0.917	0.069	0.386	0.227
	SimpleCart	0.945	0.947	0.944	0.862	0.053	0.3	0.176
<i>User #13</i>	J48	0.95	0.954	0.952	0.848	0.046	0.545	0.295
	LADTree	0.945	0.953	0.948	0.86	0.047	0.626	0.336
	RandomForest	0.938	0.953	0.939	0.868	0.046	0.816	0.431
	RandomTree	0.946	0.945	0.945	0.713	0.055	0.518	0.286
	REPTree	0.95	0.957	0.952	0.843	0.043	0.599	0.321
	SimpleCart	0.948	0.957	0.948	0.742	0.043	0.707	0.375
<i>User #14</i>	J48	0.977	0.978	0.976	0.796	0.022	0.34	0.181
	LADTree	0.966	0.968	0.967	0.893	0.032	0.34	0.186
	RandomForest	0.961	0.96	0.948	0.89	0.047	0.825	0.436
	RandomTree	0.927	0.914	0.92	0.664	0.086	0.585	0.335
	REPTree	0.965	0.968	0.966	0.815	0.032	0.413	0.222
	SimpleCart	0.969	0.971	0.97	0.826	0.029	0.34	0.184
<i>User #15</i>	J48	0.931	0.922	0.926	0.68	0.078	0.719	0.398
	LADTree	0.933	0.945	0.938	0.681	0.055	0.777	0.416
	RandomForest	0.937	0.956	0.937	0.825	0.044	0.956	0.5
	RandomTree	0.931	0.933	0.932	0.593	0.067	0.748	0.407
	REPTree	0.959	0.957	0.937	0.632	0.043	0.926	0.484
	SimpleCart	0.929	0.954	0.936	0.529	0.046	0.926	0.486

Table 4: Classification results for Users #8, #9, #10, #11, #12, #13, #14 and #15: Precision, Recall, F-Measure, RocArea, FRR, FAR and ERR for classifying the feature set, computed with six different classification algorithms. The Time column represents the time in seconds taken to build the model.

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