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Analysis of security protocols as open systems

We propose a methodology for the formal analysis of security protocols. This originates from the observation that the verification of security protocols can be conveniently treated as the verification of open systems, i.e. systems which may have unspecified components. These might be used to represent a hostile environment wherein the protocol runs and whose behavior cannot be predicted a priori. We define a language for the description of security protocols, namely Crypto-CCS, and a logical language for expressing their properties. We provide an effective verification method for security protocols which is based on a suitable extension of partial model checking. Indeed, we obtain a decidability result for the secrecy analysis of protocols with a finite number of sessions, bounded message size and new nonce generation.

Autori: Martinelli F.

Tipo: Articoli su riviste ISI
Area di disciplina: Information Technology and Communication Systems
Da pagina 1057 a pagina 1106